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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-DISMISSAL OF STATE EMPLOYEES 
FOR REFUSAL To ANSWER QUESTIONS CONCERNING MEMBERSHIP IN COM-
MUNIST ORGANIZATIONS-In companion cases state employees of Pennsyl-
vania and New York were dismissed on grounds of "incompetency"1 and 
"doubtful trust and reliability"2 for refusing to answer questions by 
superiors concerning membership in communist organizations. Petitioner 
Beilan also invoked the Fifth Amendment at a hearing by a congressional 
investigating committee between the time he refused to answer his 
superior and the time he was dismissed. Appellant Lerner had invoked 
the Fifth Amendment when he refused to answer the questions asked 
by city officials. The highest courts of the states upheld the dismissals, 
making it clear that they were based on refusal to respond to proper 
inquiry and not on disloyalty inferred from invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court from the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held, affirmed, four justices dissenting.3 
1 Incompetence was one of seven valid causes for dismissal of a tenure teacher. Pa. 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950; Supp. 1957) tit. 24, §11-1122. 
2 Dismissal was based on the Security Risk Law, 65 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 
1949; Supp. 1958) §§1101-1108. 
3 Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black and Douglas, dissented on the grounds 
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There is no denial of due process in the dismissal of a teacher for "in-
competency" because of refusal to answer questions pertaining to fitness. 
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958). On appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals of New York, 
treated as certiorari, held, affirmed, four justices dissenting.4 Invocation of 
the Fifth Amendment does not preclude a state from dismissing for 
"doubtful trust and reliability" an employee who fails to respond to 
proper inquiry. There was no constitutional violation in the dismissal 
on the stated grounds. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958). 
States and their subdivisions may establish qualifications for em-
ployment, but they may not dismiss employees for failure to comply with 
terms which are unreasonable or discriminatory.I• A state may dismiss 
an employee who refuses to indicate whether he has ever been a member 
of a communist organization.6 A state employee is denied due process, 
however, when dismissed for failure to take an oath denying membership 
in subversive organizations if knowledge of the nature and purpose of 
the organization at the time of membership is not a necessary requirement.7 
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination cannot 
be asserted in a state proceeding,8 the Court in Slochower v. Board of 
Higher Education9 held that dismissal of an employee solely because 
of his invocation of the Fifth Amendment before a congressional investi-
gating committee was unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore a violation 
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. If the state courts' 
findings of fact are accepted in the principal cases, two elements are here 
present, the absence of which motivated the Court to set aside the dis-
missal in Slochower. First, the employees were given notice that refusal 
to answer could lead to dismissal and were given opportunities for formal 
hearings. Thus the elemental requirements of procedural due process 
were satisfied.10 Second, the dismissals were based not on inferences of 
that the plea of the Fifth Amendment was inextricably involved in the dismissal. Justice 
Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented on the ground that the decisions make fitness 
for public office turn on political beliefs rather than proven ability. Justice Brennan 
dissented on the ground that the employee in fact had been branded disloyal without 
due process. 
4 Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, and Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice 
Warren, dissented respectively on the grounds stated in note 3 supra. 
5 See Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 at 555 (1956). 
6 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). It should be noted that the 
employee in Garner did not invoke the Fifth Amendment. 
7 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See Gcrende v. Board of Supervisors, 
341 U.S. 56 (1951), and Garner v. Board of Public Works, note 6 supra. 
8 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
9 Note 5 supra. No rational inference of guilt was said to be possible from an invoca-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. But see Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, 331 Mass. 
531, 120 N.E. (2d) 772 (1954). See 44 A.L.R. (2d) 789 (1955). 
10 The Court in Slochower, note 5 supra, at 559, stated that the employee's "summary 
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disloyalty but on the reftisal, in itself, to answer proper questions. The 
majority opinions in the instant cases were quite careful to point out that 
the designated bases for the discharges did not violate due process. Thus 
the state's characterization of the grounds for dismissal becomes extremely 
critical. The important issue in these cases must then be whether the 
Supreme Court should accept the findings of the state courts that the 
dismissals were based on evidence sufficient to show "incompetency" or 
"doubtful trust and reliability."11 It has been indicated that the Supreme 
Court will review the findings of a state court on questions of fact where 
a federal right has been denied as a result of a finding shown by the record 
to be without evidence to supp~rt it, and where a conclusion of law as to 
a federal right is so intermingled with the findings of fact as to make it 
necessary, in order to pass upon the federal question, to analyze the facts.12 
Recently the Court has extended this willingness to review findings of 
fact where it is asserted that a person has been deprived by a state court 
of a "fundamental" right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.13 In 
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,14 where an applicant for admission 
to the state bar refused to answer questions concerning his communist 
affiliations, the Supreme Court reversed the state court and on a re-ex-
amination of the record held that there was not sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that the applicant had failed to establish his "good 
moral character." Yet the majority of the Court in Konigsberg made it 
clear that it did not consider the question there before it to be whether 
mere refusal to answer such questions would constitute a sufficient basis 
for denial of admission to the bar.15 It may be that the thorough review 
of the record in Konigsberg was compelled by the sidestepping of the 
"mere refusal" issue.16 In the instant cases, once the Court accepted the 
dismissal'' violated due process. See concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160-174 (1951), and Hagar v. 
Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 at 708 (1884). 
11 In this connection the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan should be considered. 
It was his contention that the employees were in fact discharged because of disloyalty, 
and that there was no evidence in the record to sustain such a conclusion. 
12 United Gas Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123 at 143 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 
587 at 590 (1935); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 at 593 (1915); 
Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246 at 261 (1912). 
13 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of 
Bar Examiners of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 
367 (1947). Cases involving coerced confessions represent one specific area. See, e.g., Gallegos 
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). 
14 Note 13 supra. 
15 Justice Black stated in his majority opinion in the Konigsberg case, note 13 supra, 
at 261: "If and when a State makes failure to answer a question an independent ground 
for exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise, will have to determine 
whether the exclusion is constitutionally permissible." 
16 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in the Konigsberg case, note 13 supra, 
at 280. See also comment, 56 M1cH. L. REv. 415 at 420-422 (1958). 
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states' determinations of the grounds for dismissal, it was squarely faced 
with the "mere refusal" issue as it relates to discharge from state employ-
ment. Thus, since the questions asked were considered relevant to the 
fitness of the state employees to continue in their positions, the Court 
apparently felt it necessary to refrain from evaluating the evidence pre-
sented in the record. This restraint has much to commend it. The Court 
should be hesitant to challenge the determinations of a state court of 
review,17 especially ~here the power of a state to control its internal 
management is involved.18 The states quite properly have enjoyed broad 
powers in the selection and discharge of employees.19 It may now be 
asserted that the principal cases are a reassurance that the Supreme Court 
will respect state court evaluations of evidence and findings of fact. The 
recent change in Court personnel, however, possibly leaves this question 
open to some doubt.20 
Roger W. Findley 
17 This is especially true where the state court of review has upheld the findings 
of the lower court or administrative body which has had a first-hand view of the evidence 
and witnesses. See Lammers v. Nissen, 154 U.S. 650 (1879). In addition the Court cannot 
afford, timewise, to encourage petitions for review of findings of fact. 
18 In his dissenting opinion in the Konigsberg case, note 13 supra, at 276, Justice 
Harlan warned that the Court should be especially reluctant to establish and administer 
bar admission standards. The argument against interference with the formation and 
administration of state employment standards would seem to be even stronger. 
19 See Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, note 5 supra, at 559. 
20 Inasmuch as Justice Burton had cast the deciding vote in both the Konigsberg case 
and the principal cases, some degree of uncertainty in this area may continue to exist. 
